Kaliningrad.
In the modern, post-Soviet world, Kaliningrad is something of an anomaly, but an anomaly with teeth.
A picturesque cultural centre which boasts a renowned art gallery and a goodly number of museums, Kaliningrad is a Russian exclave situated on the Baltic coast which shares it’s borders with NATO and EU members Poland and Lithuania. It is geographically separated from the rest of Russia, and because it is the only Russian Baltic Sea port that is ice-free all year round, it plays an important part in the maintenance of the Russian Baltic Fleet, and is home to three Russian military air bases. According to reports, Russia has transported tactical nuclear warheads on a regular basis to Kaliningrad since the break up of the Soviet Union in 1991.
In fact, Kaliningrad is the most heavily militarized area of the Russian Federation, and the density of it’s military infrastructure is the highest in Europe. (1)
Repairs.
It is into this commercial, though heavily militarized port that the m.v. Arctic Sea sailed sometime in June. She docked at the Pregol Shipyard in order to have some unspecified repairs carried out, and remained there for almost two weeks before sailing for Pietarsaari on the West Coast of Finland to pick up a cargo of timber destined for Bejaia, in Algeria.
Neither the vessel nor it’s cargo were ever to reach their destination, and the events subsequent to her departure from Pietarsaari continue to grow as mysteriously as the steady decline in press reporting of the incident.
But the mystery of the Arctic Sea starts not off the coast of Sweden, when the she was allegedly boarded by 10 to 12 men claiming to be Swedish anti drugs police, but rather, in that dockyard at Kaliningrad.
The Arctic Sea, a Maltese flagged vessel whose owners and managers are listed as Solchart Management of Helsinki, Finland, (3) which company is owned by Solchart of Archangel in Russia, is a small vessel by the standards of international maritime trade.
She has a length of 97.80 metres and her beam (width) is 17.33 metres. Comparing this with a typical tanker which can easily reach 300 metres in length with a beam of 60 metres – and these are not the largest ships that sail our oceans – we can see that she is small fry indeed.
What, then, were the repairs carried out on the Arctic Sea while she was in the Pregol Shipyard? Repairs that take up to two weeks on a vessel of this size are not merely plugging a leak in the hull or replacing a blown piston gasket. In the costly and competitive world of commercial shipping, it is unusual for any vessel to be laid up for ‘repairs’ for more than a few expensive, revenue free days. This is especially true in a well equipped port like Kaliningrad, which is able to offer shipowners (and indeed the Russian Navy) the most up to date facilities and resources to return the vessel to trade in the shortest possible time.
Extensive re-fit of the vessel’s cargo holds would be, however, an entirely different matter, and indeed unconfirmed ‘intelligence reports’ (2) claim that just such alterations were made to the vessel during her stay in the Pregol shipyard. Although this is unsubstantiated, it certainly makes more sense than 2 weeks of routine repairs.
Hijacked.
After loading her cargo of timber in Finland, the vessel, with her 15 man Russian crew, sailed for Bejaia on 23rd July. She sailed south down the Baltic Sea, and in the early hours of the 24th July, according to the first news reports received 4 days later, the vessel was boarded by 10 to 12 men who arrived alongside in a black inflatable craft marked with the Swedish word ‘Polis’. And at this point, the waters begin to get very murky indeed.
This boarding of the Arctic Sea was not made known to the general public until the 28th July, some 4 days after the boarding. Authorities state that the reason for the delay is that the vessel did not report the boarding incident until this date, but had carried on it’s journey as if nothing had happened.
If this was indeed the case, it is hard to imagine why the captain chose to do so, considering the fact that his crew were reportedly badly beaten, some of them, according to press reports, suffering serious injuries which included broken teeth.
Considerable detail was included in these early reports, which included, in addition to the number of men and their method of arrival on board, their claim that they were Swedish anti drugs police, their length of stay on board, details of their ‘extensive’ search of the vessel, the fact that the crew were at one point locked in their cabins, that their mobile phones were taken from them, that some of the vessels communications and navigation equipment was either removed or destroyed, and the claim that, upon departure, their black inflatable headed off to the east. No casual gossip or speculation there.
But where did these highly detailed and highly specific reports come from? In light of subsequent events, either the information would have to have been given from the ship while the ‘hijackers’ were still in control of the vessel – an unlikely scenario, unless the boarders wanted this information in the public domain – or, alternatively, the vessel was subsequently hijacked for a second time – an equally unlikely scenario. But then everything we are told about the m.v.Arctic Sea’s subsequent adventures are unlikely, to say the least.
By the time that the captain eventually reported the boarding incident to the ship’s owners on the 28th July, the vessel had already passed through the straits of Dover, and had made her compulsory routine radio report to the British coastguard station which controls marine traffic in that busiest of world straits. The coastguard officer who received the call reported nothing unusual about the conversation, certainly no mention was made of hijackings or pirates or injured crew members, and the Arctic Sea sailed on westwards, ostensibly on her lawful and peaceful journey.
Hijacked again?
The last known radio communication with the vessel took place on either the 30th or July 31st (reports differ) when Swedish Police contacted the Arctic Sea, and, according to Maria Lonegard, a spokesperson for the Swedish Police, everything appeared normal on board. At this time the Arctic Sea was believed to be off the coast of France.
All vessels over 300 Gross Registered Tons, and all passenger carrying vessels, are required by law to be equipped with an Automatic Information System (AIS). This is primarily intended as a collision avoidance system for ships at sea, but has proven useful for coastguards, shipowners and other interested parties to track vessels in which they have an interest.
The AIS system transmits on VHF marine radio channels at short intervals, two sets of information about the ship.
The first set of information is ‘vessel specific’, in that it transmits the vessel’s unique identification numbers, it’s length, beam etc.
The second set of information transmitted is ‘voyage specific’, including it’s draft, destination, and ETA. In addition, this set includes information taken directly from the vessel’s GPS receiver – it’s position and speed. The vessel’s heading is fed in automatically from the vessel’s compass.
The Arctic Sea was fitted with an AIS transmitter, and this appears to have been working perfectly until the time of it’s disappearance. If the AIS had not been operational this would have been reported by the British coastguard as it passed through the Dover straits.
At any rate, we know that the AIS on the Arctic Sea was turned off on the 30th July, thus making the vessel invisible to all but the naked eye, coastal radar and possible satellite observation. For the next 18 days no government of any nation, could say where she was – or was prepared to say where she was. The Arctic Sea had been hijacked again.
Or was she?
Conflicting reports.
Unnamed European maritime officials are reported to have claimed that a number of radio calls to and from the ship between July 31st and August 3rd indicated that the Arctic Sea had been the victim of yet another hijack. Yet another European spokesman is reported as saying that the vessel’s Baltic Sea adventure and it’s subsequent disappearance had “nothing in common with traditional acts of piracy or armed robbery at sea".
There then followed a number of unconfirmed reports of sightings of the vessel. Coastal tracking radars were reported as having last identified the ship near Brest, France, and it was later reported as having been observed by a Portuguese maritime patrol aircraft near the Portuguese coast, although some reports claim that this was later denied by the Portuguese authorities.
Amongst all these conflicting and unconfirmed reports, one report stands out as being not only confirmed (by the French authorities), but also as adding a sinister new dimension to the mystery.
On the 2nd August, three days after her disappearance, an AIS signal bearing the identification details of the Arctic Sea was transmitted from the Bay of Biscay. The signals continued to be broadcast for 30 minutes (some reports ay 60 minutes) before being abruptly switched off again.
Apart from the unexpected and inexplicable nature of this event, what is significant about it is that a French Marines spokesman, Capt. Jerome Baroe, stated that the signals in question had come not from the m.v. Arctic Sea, but from Russian warships that were transitting the area from the Mediterranean to the Baltic Sea.
Contrary to most press reports, the AIS system fitted on board ships is not a transponder, but a simple transmitter. A transponder is a sophisticated TRANSmitter that resPONDS to an electronic interrogation from another transmitter. The AIS transmitter merely repeatedly (every 60 seconds or so) broadcasts it’s continually updated information on marine VHF channels 87 and 88, for any other AIS receiver to pick up. It would therefore be a simple matter for a trained naval officer to program any AIS transmitter with any information he wishes. In this sense, it is technically possible for an AIS signal purporting to be from the Arctic Sea to have been transmitted from a Russian warship, or indeed any other vessel equipped with an AIS transmitter.
The Russian Navy.
But why would the Russian navy do such a thing? Indeed. But let me ask you another question about why the Russian navy would ‘do such a thing’.
In response to "the rise in pirate attacks, including against Russian citizens", the Russian navy dispatched the frigate Neustrashimy (Fearless) to the waters off the Somali coast. A single frigate.
In response to the Arctic Sea ‘hijack’ the Russian navy dispatched two ‘battleships’ and a frigate, the Ladny, from the Black Sea, together with two nuclear submarines, to ‘search’ for the small, timber carrying, 30 year old cargo ship Arctic Sea which had gone missing in European waters.
Why would the Russian navy do such a thing?
Ransom.
Speculation at this time was rife in the press, with many commentators claiming, with justification, that the vessel’s cargo was of low value, as indeed was the thirty year old vessel herself. The claims made by the Russian insurance agency Renaissance Insurance Group, that on August 3rd they received a phone call demanding a ransom of 1.5 million Euros for the safe return of the vessel and her crew, are by that measure, implausible. One commentator likened the ransom demand to ‘forging one dollar bills’.
Even more implausible is the proposition that a gang of at least 10 and possibly as many as 20 or indeed more, men (reports of 10 to 12 men in the Baltic hijack, and 8 arrested when the Arctic Sea was recovered), together with all the organization, equipment, planning and logistics that this enterprise would require, would seek to hijack a low value target in some of the most regulated and heavily policed waters on the face of this planet – and be successful.
It has been speculated that the cost of the operation would be more than the value of the cargo and vessel combined, and if the total of men involved was indeed only 10, which is highly unlikely, then they would have reaped only 150,000 euros each for their rather prodigous efforts. Robbing a bank would have been easier, more lucrative, and more likely to have ended in success.
A secret cargo?
Speculation also revolved around the possibility that the Arctic Sea was the subject of a mafia war, or a drug war, or perhaps merely a trade dispute, but the theory that gained the most traction was the prospect that the Arctic Sea had been loaded with missiles whilst in the dockyard at Kaliningrad, and that these missiles were being shipped by the Russians to an unknown destination, possibly Syria or Lebanon.
It is at this point that the prospect of state involvement in the mystery of the Arctic Sea arises.
Governments.
If indeed a government, or governments, were involved in the affair, then it is easy to understand many otherwise inexplicable elements of the affair.
Firstly, the cost of the double hijacking would have been beyond the resources of most private individuals or groups, and would certainly have been disproportionate to the rewards of a simple hijack.
Secondly, the amount of organization and logistics required to hijack the vessel is more reminiscent of a national ‘secret squirrel’ enterprise, than that of a few guys trying to get (moderately) rich.
Thirdly, the amount of media management of the affair, which was, and still is, significant, would require a lot of weight to be thrown around – weight that could only come from ‘Corridors of Power’. It seems possible, likely even, that the early, detailed, reports of the Baltic sea hijack were deliberately seeded into the media’s news gathering mechanisms. This would explain how extensive supposed details of the hijack of a ship that was still under ‘hijack’, came to be made public.
Fourthly, and perhaps most significantly, the response of the Russian navy in sending a large fleet of warships to recover the Arctic Sea is more appropriate to a major issue of national security than it is to an intervention in a mafia spat.
So if governments are involved – which governments?
We know that the Russian government is involved on at least one level – the recovery of the Arctic Sea. But why would the Russian navy commit so many resources to this effort, unless, perhaps, there is indeed a connection with the vessel’s stay in Kaliningrad, and unless perhaps, the speculation regarding nuclear missiles is not too far off the mark. Certainly, smuggling of drugs, or even conventional weapons, would be unlikely to precipitate the mobilization of Russia’s Black Sea fleet as a response.
And if indeed the vessel was carrying a secret Russian military cargo to the Mediterranean, then which government would be the most motivated to ensure that it didn’t reach it’s destination?
Israel springs readily to mind.
In addition, the Government of Israel is perhaps the only western government with the will, the audacity, to undertake the hijacking of a vessel flying under the flag of a European nation in the dead of night, in European waters.
The Nuclear scenario.
It is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which Mossad, the Israeli secret service, learns of a plot to secretly ship nuclear weapons to one of Israel’s enemies. In such a case the government of Israel would certainly resolve that, no matter what the cost, no matter what the consequences, the shipment WILL be stopped.
But if so, then why not merely wait until the vessel is in the open Atlantic, and then board her and sink her, a course of action which Israel certainly has the resources to undertake?
The answer to that question may well lie in the nature of the cargo. No government would want to consign a cargo of nuclear material to the bottom of the Atlantic, or any other, Ocean if there was a better way.
Faced with the problem of how to stop the shipment without sinking the vessel, the best solution would be to somehow induce the Russians to take the cargo back to Russia…..
On 17 August the Arctic Sea was announced as having been recovered by the Russian frigate Ladny off the coast of the Cape Verde Islands without a shot being fired. Early reports stated that the Arctic Sea had been taken under tow – to Russia.
The mystery continues.
Subsequent reports claim that the vessel, rather than being towed to Russia, was at that time adrift off the Cape Verde Islands, and that the 8 unarmed ‘hijackers’, together with 11 of the 15 man Russian crew, were flown directly back to Russia.
Speculation persists as to why it was necessary to fly this small number of men (and of course their military guards) in not one, but three gigantic, Russian heavy lift military aircraft. (4)
There are many more unanswered questions in the story of the m.v. Arctic Sea, many more implausible explanations and many more conflicting reports of the events. It is unlikely that we will ever be trusted with the real story.
Puzzled.
Of the many unanswered questions, one in particular looms large.
Given that there was a ‘rogue’ ship loose somewhere in the North Atlantic, a ship that from any viewpoint had at least the possibility of being loaded with nuclear weapons, the normally super-sensitive USA has been remarkably quiet on the affair.
There has been no mobilization of the Atlantic Fleet, no alarm bells ringing in the Pentagon (at least, that we were told of) and apparently no interest whatsoever in this possible threat to the security of their homeland. Either the US alone in the world had accepted the story of a simple hijack for ransom of the vessel, her cargo and crew, or they had sufficient knowledge of the affair to make them complacent about the outcome.
After the crew arrived in Moscow, the editor of the Russian maritime bulletin Sovfrakht, Mikhail Voitenko, said he had spoken to some of the men overnight, and remained puzzled about the sequence of events. (5)
He’s in good company. But I would hazard a guess that this company does not include the governments of Russia, Israel and the United States.
(1) Wikipedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kaliningrad
(2) Canada Free Press 24th August 2009
http://www.canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/14048
(3) Clarkson Research Serices Ltd/Tradewinds.no
http://www.tradewinds.no/vessel?id=7F71C55DCA5DD727
(4) The Scotsman, 25th August 2009
http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/world/Arctic-Sea-hijackers-and-crew.5575546.jp
(5) The Guardian 19th August 2009
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/19/arctic-sea-ransom-demanded
